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Abstract
This paper analyses the extent of income inequality and opportu-
nity inequality in 25 European countries. The present work contributes
to understanding the origin of standard income inequality, helping to
identify potential institutional setups that are associated to opportu-
nity inequality. We distinguish between ex ante and ex post opportu-
nity inequality. We find that ex ante equality of opportunity exhibits
positive correlation with public expenditure in education, whereas ex
post equality of opportunity is also positively associated to union pres-
ence and to fiscal redistribution.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we propose a methodology to measure the degree of inequal-
ity of opportunities and to decompose overall income inequality into two
components: unfair inequalities, i.e., income inequality due to initial and
exogenous circumstances and fair inequalities, i.e., income inequality due
to individual eﬀort and responsibility. We then apply this methodology to
measure inequalities in 25 European countries and make an attempt to cor-
relate the extent of opportunity inequality to institutional aspects of such
countries.
Measuring the degree of inequality of opportunity is interesting per se,
if one believes that "levelling the playing field", rather than equalizing the
final results, is the objective of a "just society". This position has been
put forward in the last decades by philosophers such as Dworkin (1981a,b),
Arneson (1989), Cohen (1989) and by economists such as Roemer (1993,
1998) and Fleurbaey (1995, 2008). These authors have defended the idea
that diﬀerences in outcomes due to exogenous circumstances are ethically
unacceptable and should be compensated (Compensation Principle); while
diﬀerences due to eﬀort are to be considered ethically acceptable and do not
need any intervention (Reward Principle1).
In addition to normative reasons, the evidence we propose can have an
important instrumental value. First, social attitudes towards redistributive
policies may be aﬀected by the knowledge, or the perception, of the origin
of income inequalities (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005): existing surveys show
that most people judge income inequalities arising from diﬀerent levels of
eﬀort as less objectionable than those due to exogenous circumstances as
race, family origin, etc.. Hence, by showing that a large amount of existing
inequalities is due to unequal ex-ante opportunities may increase the support
for redistributive policies. Second, opportunity inequality, rather than in-
come inequality, can be strongly related to aggregate economic performance:
it has been suggested (Bourguignon et al. 2007 and World Bank, 2006) that
the existence of strong and persistent inequalities in the initial opportunities
open to individuals can generate true inequality traps that represent severe
constraints to future perspectives of growth of an economy, by preventing
entire groups from participation into economic and social life2. Finally, the
analysis of opportunity inequality might help to understand the generation
of income inequality and to identify the priorities of public intervention: the
knowledge of the factors explaining income inequality can help to iden-
tify the more deprived groups in a society, thereby revealing new points of
emphasis in social and redistributive policies.
1We refer here to the utilitarian version of the reward principle. A diﬀerent "liberal"
version could also be formulated (see Fleurbaey 2008).
2 Indeed, an empirical analysis of the relation between opportunity inequality and
growth is an interesting task for future research.
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For example, two countries A and B may exhibit the same level of overall
income inequality and still being in need of very diﬀerent public interventions
if in one country there is a much larger fraction of inequality attributable to,
say, ethnic or gender factors. While in the first case income redistribution,
via the tax system, and universal social protection may be the adequate pol-
icy measures, in the latter case more tailor-made, categorical interventions
could be advisable.
We believe that these considerations are relevant for many European
countries and for the debate on social protection and social policies in Eu-
rope. Nevertheless, the literature on the measurement of inequality of op-
portunity, both at the methodological and the empirical level, is still in
its infancy. See among others, Bourguignon et al. (2003), Checchi and
Peragine (2009), Dardanoni et al. (2006), Ferreira and Gignoux (2008),
Lefranc et al. (2008), Moreno-Ternero (2007), Paes de Barros et al. (2009),
Peragine (2002, 2004a,b), Peragine and Serlenga (2008), Pistolesi (2009),
Villar (2006), World Bank (2006). This literature has developed two main
approaches to measuring opportunity inequality, namely the ex-ante and the
ex-post approach. According to the ex-ante approach, there is equality of
opportunity (EOp) if the set of opportunities is the same for all individuals,
regardless of their circumstances. This approach consists of partitioning the
population in types formed by individuals endowed with the same circum-
stances: the income distribution within a circumstance class is interpreted
as the opportunity set open to individuals in that class. Hence, in order
to measure opportunity inequality, one focuses on the inequality between
types. On the other side, according to the ex-post approach, there is EOp
if and only if all those who exert the same eﬀort end out with the same
outcome. This means that opportunity inequality within this approach is
measured as inequality within responsibility classes, i.e. within the set of
individuals at the same eﬀort level.
These two approaches express diﬀerent and sometimes conflicting views
on equality of opportunity3 and in fact the rankings they generate may be
diﬀerent. However, most of the existing empirical analysis of opportunity
inequality have adopted an ex ante approach. In this paper we explore both
the ex ante and the ex post approach and we oﬀer some insights on the
diﬀerent results they provide. In the estimation of opportunity inequality
we compare parametric models vis a vis with non parametric methods of
decomposition. Each method has pros and cons: the non parametric models
avoid the arbitrary choice of a specific functional form on the relationship
between outcome, circumstances and eﬀort; on the other hand, parametric
models allow studying partial eﬀects of circumstances on outcome, other
things constant (i.e. they make it easier building and studying counterfac-
3Fleurbaey and Peragine (2009) study the clash between ex ante and ex post notions
of EOp.
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tuals).
The empirical application is divided in two parts. First, we provide
estimates of income inequality and opportunity inequality in 25 European
countries available in the EU-SILC database. Our results show that al-
though the expected ranking among Northern European and Mediterranean
countries is generally respected, our measures of inequality of opportunities
shed new light on the distributional patterns of European countries. It is
possible to identify roughly three groups of countries: i) formerly centrally
planned economies (Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia , plus Portu-
gal as outlier) that reach higher levels of total inequality, and intermediate
levels of opportunity inequality; ii) most of continental Europe exhibit rel-
atively high levels of inequality of opportunity, despite moderate levels of
total inequality; iii) the “egalitarian” countries, where both types of in-
equality obtain the lowest values (Nordic countries plus Slovenia and Slovak
Republic).
Our results also highlight the diﬀerence between the ex ante and ex post
approaches: these approaches do capture diﬀerent aspects of opportunity
inequality and are associated to diﬀerent sets of institutions, corresponding
to pre- and post-labour market entry. Existing data indicate that equality
of opportunity, in the ex ante version, is positively correlated with public
expenditure in education. Equality of opportunity, when measured ex post,
is also positively associated to union presence and to fiscal redistribution.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our methodol-
ogy for measuring opportunity inequality and decomposing overall income
inequality. Section 3 contains our empirical analysis: the data description,
the estimating procedure and the discussion of the results. Section 4 con-
cludes with some final remarks and some directions for future research.
2 Measuring opportunity inequality: a simple model
Each individual in our society is completely described by a list of traits,
which can be partitioned into two diﬀerent classes: circumstances and ef-
fort. The first class includes traits beyond the individual responsibility,
represented by a person’s set of circumstances c, belonging to a finite set
Ω = {c1, ..., cn} . Circumstances include a vast list of income generating in-
puts that are out of control of the individual, like gender, age, ethnicity,
region of residence or parental background. Various notions of equality of
opportunity correspond to diﬀerent choices of which of these variables are
to be regarded as circumstances.4 If the only circumstances were gender,
which can only take values in the set {male, female} , and parental education,
that only takes values in the set {graduate parents, non graduate parents},
4Geographical diﬀerences are an example of circumstances which can either be treated
as exogenously given, or under the control of an individual who may choose migration.
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then the set Ω would be the following: Ω=({female, non graduate parents},
{female, graduate parents}, {male, non graduate parents}, {male, graduate
parents}).
The second class includes factors for which the individual is fully respon-
sible and is represented by a scalar variable, eﬀort, e ∈ Θ. We assume that
eﬀort is one-dimensional. It is important to remind that by eﬀort in this
paper we mean not only the extent to which a person exerts himself, but all
the other background traits of the individual that might aﬀect his success,
but that are excluded from the list of circumstances. This amounts to say
that any other factors, as native ability, talent, or even luck, are implicitly
classified as within the sphere of individual responsibility. This assump-
tion may lead us to overestimate the portion of inequality which is ethically
acceptable, and conversely to underestimate equality of opportunity5.
Income is generated by a function g : Ω×Θ→ R+, that assigns individual
incomes to combinations of eﬀort and circumstances:
x = g(c, e)
To save notation, we may also write x (c, e) and refer to it as both the
individual income and the relevant income distribution.
We assume that the function g ismonotonically increasing in eﬀort e. As
for the relationship between circumstances and eﬀort, we believe that the
assumption of orthogonality between these two components would be ex-
cessively restrictive (Checchi and Peragine 2009): rather, we consider the
case in which preferences are partly determined by circumstances and hence
we distinguish between a direct eﬀect of circumstances on outcomes and an
indirect eﬀect via the choice of eﬀort.
We now consider two diﬀerent partitions of the total population. First,
for ci ∈ Ω, we call type i the set of individuals whose set of circumstances
is ci. The type income distribution represents the set of outcome levels
which can be achieved - by exerting diﬀerent degrees of eﬀort - starting
from the same circumstance ci. That is to say, the type distribution is a
representation of the opportunity set - expressed in terms of outcomes -
open to any individual endowed with circumstances ci.
The second partition is based on the eﬀort variable: for e ∈ Θ, we
call tranche e the set of individuals whose eﬀort is e. However, as we are
considering the case of non observability of eﬀort, we need to deduce the
degree of eﬀort from some observable behavior. Following Roemer (1993,
1998) we say that all individuals at the pth quantile of the eﬀort distribution
in their types, have tried equally hard. Given the monotonicity of the income
function, this will correspond to the quantile in the income distribution of
the type.
5On the eﬀect of partial observability of the circumstances on the estimates of oppor-
tunity inequality see Luongo and Peragine (2009).
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Thus, we define the tranche p in a population as the subset of individ-
uals whose eﬀort is at the pth rank of their respective type distributions.
The two partitions suggest two diﬀerent approaches to measure opportunity
inequality.
The first approach focuses on ex post inequalities in classes of individuals
with identical eﬀort. Consequently, it looks at the tranches distributions.
The ex post approach. There is EOp if all those who exerted the same
degree of eﬀort have the same outcome. Inequality of opportunity decreases
if outcome inequality decreases among the individuals at the same degree of
eﬀort.
Thus, the ex post approach6 emphasizes inequalities within eﬀort groups:
it is therefore an expression of the principle of compensation. On the other
hand, diﬀerences between the tranches are interpreted as due to individual
eﬀort, and are not considered as unfair.
In contrast, the second approach focuses on the types distributions and
is based on the following definition of equality of opportunity.
The ex ante approach. There is EOp if the set of opportunities is the
same, regardless of the circumstances. Inequality of opportunity decreases if
inequality between individual opportunity sets decreases.
Thus, the ex ante approach7 puts special emphasis on the diﬀerences
in the outcome prospects for classes of individuals with identical circum-
stances. Accordingly, it focuses on inequality between types, and is instead
neutral with respect to inequality within types. By stating the irrelevance
of the eﬀort based inequalities within each types, the ex ante approach is
an expression of a reward-focused approach to equality of opportunity (see
Fleurbaey 2008, ch. 9).
Both approaches appear as relevant and plausible, and it is diﬃcult to
give priority to one or another. Therefore, we now develop each of them in
turn, and for each of them we provide a measure of opportunity inequality.
2.1 The ex-post approach
In the ex post approach opportunity inequality is given by inequality within
tranches. To capture such inequality we may construct an hypothetical
standardized distribution obtained after the following transformation:
x (c, e)→ x (c, e)
x (c¯, e)
x (c¯, e¯)
6This is the approach proposed by Roemer (1993, 1998) and defended by Fleurbaey
(2008).
7This approach has been proposed, in diﬀerent frameworks, by Van de Gaer (1993),
Kranich (1996), Peragine (2004a).
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where x (c¯, e) is the artificial distribution obtained by using a constant ref-
erence value of circumstances c¯, and x (c¯, e¯) is obtained by using reference
values of both circumstances and eﬀort.
Note that for every scale invariant inequality measure I:
I
µ
x (c, e)
x (c¯, e)
x (c¯, e¯)
¶
= I
µ
x (c, e)
x (c¯, e)
¶
.
Hence, in the ex post approach inequality of opportunity is given by
a (scale invariant) inequality index I applied to the artificial distribution
x(c,e)
x(c¯,e) :
OIex−post = I
µ
x (c, e)
x (c¯, e)
¶
or, in relative terms:
OIex−postrelative =
I
³
x(c,e)
x(c¯,e)
´
I (x (c, e))
.
What is the meaning of the reference value x (c¯, e)? This depends on the
specific measurement approach one decides to adopt8: in a non parametric
approach x (c¯, e)may be interpreted as the average income of a given tranche
identified by e (call it μe), and x (c¯, e¯) as the grand mean of the overall
distribution (call it μ). Then for any path independent measure of inequality9
(Foster and Shneyrov, 2000) we have:
I (x (c, e)) = I
µ
x (c, e)
μe
¶
+ I (μe)
The distribution x (c, e) is the original income vector; μe is a hypothetical
smoothed distribution in which each person’s income is replaced with the
mean income of the tranche she belongs to. This smoothing process removes
all inequality within the tranches, hence I (μe) captures the inequality only
due to individual responsibility; x(c,e)μe is a standardized distribution ob-
tained by proportionally scaling each tranche distribution until it has the
same mean as the overall distribution. Standardization suppresses between-
tranche inequality while leaving within tranche inequality unaltered. Hence
8Diﬀerent interpretations are possible: for instance, in a normative approach, x (c¯, e)
could be represented by the equally distributed equivalent income of a given tranche
identified by e.
9 In particular, we need to use the mean logarithmic deviation (MLD), which is the
only index which has a path-independent decomposition using the arithmetic mean as the
representative income. For a distribution X = (x1, ..., xN ) with mean μX the MLD is
defined as:
MLD (X) =
1
N
N[
i=1
ln
μX
xi
7
I
³
x(c,e)
μe
´
fully captures the income inequality due to circumstances only,
i.e. the inequality of opportunity.
Hence the decomposition above can be interpreted as:
total inequality = within tranches inequality + between tranches inequality
total inequality = opportunity inequality + eﬀort inequality
Thus, we have a measure of opportunity inequality and a decomposition
of overall inequality into an ethically acceptable and an ethically oﬀensive
part.
In a parametric analysis this procedure corresponds to estimate, for each
tranche (p), the following equation
lnxi = βpci + εi, (1)
where ci is the all set of circumstances, and obtaining a counterfactual dis-
tribution of income as xˆp = exp
³
βˆpc¯p
´
, where c¯p is the average value of
characteristics in each tranche. Inequality of opportunity can be therefore
calculated parametrically by I
³
xi
xˆp
´
.
Both the parametric and non parametric measures proposed so far im-
plicitly assume no correlation between circumstances and eﬀort. Hence they
are able to measure only the direct eﬀect of circumstances on outcomes.
As discussed above, a more plausible option is that eﬀort is somehow
related to circumstances and therefore there exists a distribution of eﬀort,
F tεi , for each type, ε
t
i. In order to take into account the possible correlation,
following Björklund et al. (2010), we control for the diﬀerence in distribu-
tions of eﬀort by considering heterogeneous variances σ2t = V ar
£
εti|cti
¤
, and
rewrite (1) as
lnxi = βci + εti −
εti
kσt|{z}
ui
+
εti
kσt|{z}
ui
, (2)
where k = 1σ , σ is the overall variance and ui is a residual with variance σ
2
across all types. Hence total inequality is now decomposed in three parts:
the first term captures the pure eﬀect of circumstances, the component ε˜ti =¡
εti − ui
¢
is a residual term which measures individual eﬀort correlated to
circumstances, whose variance varies across type, whereas the component
ui is a residual which proxies for "pure" individual eﬀort - not influenced
by circumstances - whose variance does not vary across type. If eﬀort is
correlated to circumstances, the residual ui is a better proxy for eﬀort; hence
in what follows we use such a measure of eﬀort to partition the population
into tranche and derive a direct measure of ex-post inequality.10
10As noted in Björklund et al. (2010), in order to implement this procedure we should
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2.2 The ex-ante approach
In the ex ante approach opportunity inequality is given by inequality be-
tween types. To capture such inequality we may construct an hypothetical
smoothed distribution obtained after the following transformation:
x (c, e)→ x (c, e¯)
where x (c, e¯) is the artificial distribution obtained by using a constant
reference value of eﬀort e¯.
Hence, in the ex ante approach inequality of opportunity is given by a
(scale invariant) inequality index I applied to the distribution x (ci, e¯) :
OIex−ante = I (x (c, e¯))
or, in relative terms:
OIex−anterelative =
I (x (c, e¯))
I (x (c, e))
.
The meaning of x (ci, e¯) depends again on the specific measurement approach
one decides to adopt.
In a non parametric descriptive approach x (c, e¯) can be represented by
the average income of a given type identified by c (call it μc). Then for
any path independent measure of inequality (Foster and Shneyrov, 2000) we
have that
I (x (c, e)) = I
µ
x (c, e)
μc
¶
+ I (μc) .
The interpretation is as follows: by measuring the inequality in the artificial
vector μc, obtained by replacing each income with its type mean income,
we capture only and fully the between-types inequality, which, in turn, re-
flects the opportunity inequality. On the other hand, by rescaling all type
distributions until all types have the same mean income, hence obtaining
the distribution x(c,e)μc , we are left with an income vector in which the only
inequality present is the within-types inequality, to be interpreted as in-
equality due to individual responsibility. Hence the decomposition above
can be interpreted as:
total inequality = within types inequality + between types inequality
total inequality = eﬀort inequality + opportunity inequality
first estimate the β coeﬃcients and then, based on OLS residual, the type-specific variances
σt. However, in the case where the types have few observations this will lead to small
σt and large ui. We therefore once again follow Björklund et al. (2010) and regress
the estimated variances on background characteristics, and use fitted values from that
regression as basis for ε
t
i
kσt
.
9
Thus, again, we have a measure of opportunity inequality and a decom-
position of overall inequality into an ethically acceptable and an ethically
oﬀensive part. As for the ex post approach, inequality of opportunity by
the ex ante approach can also be computed parametrically. Also in this
case we consider the possible interaction between eﬀort and circustances
and estimate (2) for the whole population such that
lnxi = βci + ε˜ti + ui.
Hence, we derive the following counterfactual distributions xˆi = exp(βˆci)
and exp(ε˜ti). According to the ex ante approach, inequality consists of
three parts: one due to circumstances, I (xˆi) , that can be computed in a
parametric and non parametric way, the direct ex-ante; one due to eﬀort
correlated to circumstances, I(exp(ε˜ti)), the ex ante type variation due to
eﬀort or indirect ex-ante, which can only be identified parametrically, and a
residual due to pure eﬀort.11
In the following empirical analysis we will compare our estimates12 of
OIex−post (parametric and non parametric) and OIex−ante (parametric and
non parametric) and use them for an analysis of the relationship between the
extent of opportunity inequality and some relevant policy and institutional
variables.
3 The empirical analysis: income inequality and
opportunity inequality in Europe
3.1 Data description
We use data from the 2005 wave of the European Survey on Income and
Living Conditions (EUSILC) which is annually conducted by the national
Central Statistics Oﬃces (CSOs) in order to obtain information on the in-
come and living conditions of diﬀerent household types. The survey contains
information on a large number of individual and household characteristics
as well as specific information on poverty and social exclusion. Representa-
tive random samples of households throughout a large number of European
countries are approached to provide the required information. We consider
25 countries in our analysis, namely Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Cyprus
(CY), Czech Republic (CZ), Germany (DE), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE),
Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), Greece (GR), Hungary (HU), Ire-
land (IE), Italy (IT), Lithuania (LT), Luxembourg (LU), Latvia (LV), the
11Ferreira and Guignoux (2008).adopt an ex ante approach similar to the one we use.
However, they implicitly assume orthogonality between eﬀort and circumstances and there-
fore do not capture the indirect eﬀect of circumstances.
12Notice that when using linear models parametric and non parametric measures give
exactly the same results. However, the parametric methods allows to easily provide stan-
dard errors for our measure via bootstrapping.
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Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Sweden (SE),
Slovenia (SI), Slovakia (SK) and the United Kingdom (UK).13
Diﬀerently from other sources of data EUSILC provides a common data
source with comparable individual and household level micro-data on in-
come and living conditions in the EU countries, allowing for significant im-
provements in the comparability of country-specific measures. EUSILC is
expected to become the EU reference source for comparative statistics on in-
come distribution and social exclusion at European level. Indeed, our study
has been made possible by the inclusion in the 2005 EUSILC survey of a
specific data module providing data for attributes of each respondent’s par-
ents during her childhood period when aged 14-16. This additional module
reports information on family composition, number of siblings, the educa-
tional attainment, occupational as well as the labour market activity status
of respondent’s mother and father and the presence of financial problems
in household. In what follows parental education is measured by the high-
est educational attainment in the parent couple. Individuals are therefore
divided in three groups: group 1 refers to individuals having both parents
with no education; 2 corresponds to individuals who have at least one par-
ent completing primary or secondary (lower or upper) school degree, while
group 3 corresponds to individuals who have at least one of the parents
with post-secondary or tertiary degree. Parental occupation is also divided
in three categories: category 1 corresponds to individuals having both par-
ents employed in elementary occupations (such as plant and machine oper-
ator and assembler - groups 8000 and 9000 in the ISCO88 classification);
category 2 refers to individuals who have at least one parent employed in
semi-skilled occupations (occupied as service worker, shop and market sales
worker, skilled agricultural and fishery worker or as craft and related trades
workers - groups from 5000 to 7000 in the ISCO88 classification); finally,
category 3 refers to individuals who have at least one of the parents working
in top-rank occupations (like legislator, senior oﬃcial, manager, professional,
technician, associate professional or clerk - groups from 1000 to 4000 in the
ISCO88 classification). In the empirical analysis we also consider some ad-
ditional individual characteristics as circumstances. This set comprehends
gender, nationality (distinguishing those who declare the country of birth
being the same of the country of residence) and geographical location (dis-
tinguishing people living in densely populated area form others). Hence,
in total we have 72 types. Finally, we partition our sample in ten tranches
although results are proved to be generally consistent when considering a
diﬀerent number of tranches.
We restrict the sample to individuals working full-time or part-time,
unemployed and those fulfilling domestic tasks and care responsibilities aged
13The original EUSILC file contains information also on Iceland. However, coding of
educational attainment in this case contains errors.
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between 30 and 60.14 Our outcome variable is post-tax individual earnings;
this variable is already available for 18 out of 25 countries under analysis,
whereas for the remaining ones we imputed net income from gross income
using information available on tax rates in 2004.15 Being aware of the fact
that welfare indicators estimated from micro-data can be very sensitive to
the presence of extreme incomes (Cowell and Victoria-Feser, 1996a, 1996b,
2002) we censored the countries’ income distributions by dropping the very
extreme values.16 Tables 5 and 6 show summary statistics of both individual
and parental characteristics.
3.2 Income and opportunity inequality rankings in Europe
In this section we aim to provide a ranking of European countries with re-
spect to EOp using both the ex ante and the ex post approach. Starting
with the estimates of overall income inequalities, we notice that the ranking
based on Gini index from our data is quite consistent with the ranking pro-
vided by OECD and Eurostat (see Table 1 and Figure 1).17 In particular
our evidence shows that Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal and Estonia
obtain the highest values in all data sources. They are followed by the UK,
Ireland and Mediterranean countries like Greece, Italy and Spain whereas
Nordic countries like Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden close the rank-
ing with low values of both Gini and MLD (see also Figure 2). Notice that
both here and in the sequel, Slovenia tends to behave like a Nordic country.
Turning to the measurement of inequality of opportunity, our attention
is confined to the MLD which is the only index that allows for a perfect
decomposition of total income inequality in eﬀort inequality and opportu-
nity inequality; this index still exhibits a country ranking which is not very
dissimilar from the one oﬀered by the Gini index (see again Figure 2). As a
first insight we notice that inequality of opportunity generally accounts for
a substantial share of income inequality in the EU countries under analysis
14We exclude pupils, students, those in an unpaid work experience, those in retirement
or in early retirement, permanently disabled or/and unfit to work, those in compulsory
military community or service and other inactive person. However, since the mean loga-
rithmic deviation is computed over positive incomes only, in what follows we are implicitly
excluding all individuals with zero incomes. Further results and statistics on the issue are
available upon request form the authors.
15Tables 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 in the Appendix show the progressive tax rate
used for the conversion. As for Slovakia we used a flat tax rate of 19% (source:
http://www.finance.gov.sk/). Since we do not have information about tax deduction,
it is likely that we are obviously overestimating income inequality in net incomes for these
countries. However, in the sequel, all these countries (but Netherlands) are grouped as
most egalitarian countries.
16Van Kerm (2007) discusses how ordinal comparisons of countries are found to be
robust to variants of data adjustment procedures such as trimming and winsorizing.
17Spearman rank correlation between EUSILC Gini and the ones calculated by OECD
and Eurostat are 0.93 and 0.9, respectively.
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(see Table (2)). Due to the lack of suﬃcient information on parental occupa-
tion (Sweden and United Kingdom) and degree of urbanization (Netherlands
and Slovenia), we have left out these variables while defining circumstances.
According to the ex ante approach inequality of opportunity explains from
the 2,5% to the 30% of income inequality whereas considering the ex post
definition we obtain much larger values, from the 16% to the 45%. As
mentioned in the previous section, given the partial observability of circum-
stances, those values can only be considered as lower bound estimates.
Table (3) shows the ranking obtained by absolute measures of type and
tranche approach, respectively. As expected the ex post values are higher
than the ex ante ones. Interestingly enough, the ex ante and the ex post
measures, although highly correlated, show diﬀerent rankings of the coun-
tries under analysis. This evidence fulfils the theoretical expectations about
the diﬀerent roles played by these two concepts, thus confirming the impor-
tance of measuring EOp using both the ex ante and the ex post definitions.
Going from the ex ante to the ex post approach we find significant rank-
reversals, with Germany yielding the largest upward shift, whereas Czech
Republic, Estonia, Norway and Portugal worsening their position, achieving
lower EOp (see Figure 3). Tables 2 and 3 show also the decomposition of
overall inequality of opportunity into a direct term and an indirect term:
the latter term, which is intended to capture the eﬀect of circumstances on
the choice of eﬀort, account for a portion between 10% and 25% of overall
opportunity inequality.
What is the meaning to be attributed to these diﬀerent rankings? By
construction, the ex ante approach is focused on the inequality between
social types, therefore is less sensitive to inter-individuals inequalities within
the same social type. Hence countries which show high level of ex ante
opportunity inequality are characterized by bigger distances between social
groups. On the other hand, the ex post measures are able to capture in
a finer way the individual income gaps due to circumstances. Therefore
one could expect the ex ante figures to be less correlated than the ex post
figures to overall income inequality: this is in fact confirmed by the data
(see Figures 4 and 5).18
If we look at Figure 4, we clearly notice three distinct patterns. Most of
formerly centrally planned economies ( Hungary, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia
and Estonia, plus Portugal as outlier) reach higher levels of total inequal-
ity, for given level of EOp. Conversely, most of continental Europe (Chez
Republic as an outlier) exhibits relatively higher levels of EOp, despite mod-
erate levels of total inequality. A third group of countries can be detected
in the south-west region of the graph, where both types of inequality obtain
the lowest values (in addition to Nordic countries - Norway, Sweden, Den-
18The correlation coeﬃcient between ex ante inequality and total inequality is 0.61,
while the corresponding correlation with the ex post measure is 0.81.
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mark and Finland - we could count Slovenia and Slovak Republic). Results
remain consistent even when we consider ex post EOp in Figure 5.
A more consistent grouping can be obtained by applying cluster analysis
to the relevant variables (total inequality, ex ante inequality of opportunity
and ex post inequality of opportunity), using average-linkage cluster analy-
sis. The corresponding dendrogram shown in Figure 6 indicates that data
can be partitioned into two big groups. Starting from the left-hand side we
find most of the continental Europe (Austria, Ireland, Netherlands, Cyprus,
Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain and United Kingdom, Czech Republic and
Hungary as outliers- among them average total inequality 0.20, ex post op-
portunity inequality 0.07, ex ante opportunity inequality 0.03) and most
of the formerly planned economies (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and
Portugal as outlier - in this case the group average are 0.24 (total inequal-
ity), 0.07 ( ex post opportunity inequality) and 0.03 (ex ante opportunity
inequality)). These countries can be labeled “high income inequality - low
equality of opportunities”. We then find and intermediate group (France,
Luxembourg and Belgium - average inequality measures 0.15, 0.05 and 0.03
respectively), which share low income inequality combined with an inter-
mediate level of EOp. Finally, on the right hand side we find the group of
“low income inequality - high equality of opportunities” countries (Slovenia,
Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland, Slovak Republic - among this group
the average total inequality 0.11, ex post opportunity inequality is 0.03 and
ex ante opportunity inequality is 0.01).
While recent access to free market may have contributed to the rise
in total inequality, it is interesting to notice that not all formerly planned
economies correspond to the case of low EOp. Even within continental
Europe, we observe diﬀerences among countries that are usually grouped
together (like France which typically goes with Germany - see Hall and
Soskice 2001).
3.3 Accounting for opportunity inequality: descriptive evi-
dence
In this section we analyze the potential association between institutional
characteristics and opportunity inequality. We are perfectly aware that we
cannot go beyond suggested correlations, given the limited number of cases
in this cross-country analysis. Nevertheless some theoretical expectation can
be confronted with the data. For example, we expect the ex ante measure of
EOp to be mostly correlated with institutional features of the educational
system, because acquired education shape the earning capability of indi-
viduals. On the contrary, fiscal redistribution and labour market variables,
which are more related to overall income diﬀerentials among individuals, are
expected to be more correlated to ex post EOp.
Institutional measures are themselves problematic, for they are mostly
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derived from categorical variable that describe procedures (presence/absence
of a provision, alternatives available, stages to be accomplished). How-
ever we may (partially) account for the role of institutions by resorting
to proxy variables, obtained from observed behavior of people acting un-
der a given institution. To provide an example, we know that for histor-
ical/cultural/institutional reasons, countries diﬀer in childcare availability.
Counting the number of available kindergartens would be a possible candi-
date for this institutional feature, but data are diﬃcult to collect on a com-
parable cross-country basis. Resorting to the fraction of children attending
kindergarten constitutes a reasonable alternative, which is much simpler to
be collected from international/national statistical oﬃces. As with most
of institutional measures, this variable is potentially endogenous, since we
ignore whether children do not attend kindergartens because they are not
available, because their mother prefer housewifery and/or because most of
the population still live in enlarged families (where grandparents take care
of nursing). Nevertheless, the literature suggests that early schooling may
contribute to reducing the role of parental background in competence for-
mation (for example Heckman et al, 2002, and Cunha and Heckman, 2007).
As a consequence, other things constant we expect that countries where
children attend kindergarten more are also characterised by greater EOp,
since income diﬀerences by types (ex-ante EOp) should be lower. In the same
vein, we know that the stratification of the educational system may reinforce
the impact of parents’ education, since low educated parents may prevents
their kids from aspiring to more academic oriented careers (see for exam-
ple Hanushek and Wößmann, 2006, and Brunello and Checchi, 2007). The
quality of education may also play a role, since it may compensate the dis-
advantage of students coming from poor environment. Unfortunately, data
on school quality are not easily available (unless one is ready to consider
students achievements as a proxy for "revealed" quality). More modestly,
we have considered economic resources publicly invested in the educational
system as proxies for quality of education.
The apparent correlation between our measure of EOp and educational
variables is evident in Figures 7 and 8. We do expect that EOp being rein-
forced by kindergarten attendance19 and by comprehensive secondary school
systems20, because both designs reduces the impact of parental education.
19Source: OECD online database (http://www.oecd.org/education/database). Data
are referred to 2002, and are obtained from Brunello and Checchi (2007). The enrolment
in pre-primary schooling of 4-year-old children made available from Eurostat with refer-
ence to 2005 was discarded because it was reporting values at 100% for some countries,
contradicting the figures contained in Education at a glance from OECD.
20Data from Eurostat 2005 (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/
statistics/search_database). This indicator provides information on the percentage of
boys and girls in upper secondary education who are enrolled in the vocational stream. It
is indicative in the importance of initial vocational education and training in a country,
taking into account also the gender dimension.
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Figure 7 shows that this is true for both dimensions. However, when both
variables are taken into account, this weak association tends to vanish (as
it can be grasped looking at the first two columns of 4). When considering
educational resources (Figure 8), we find that better quality education (i.e.
less student per teacher - we were forced to use primary education, as it was
the only variable which was non missing21 - and/or more expenditure in ed-
ucation over GDP22) is associated to greater EOp, both ex ante and ex post
EOp. The positive correlation between public expenditure in education and
EOp is also statistically significant in multivariate regression (see columns
3-4 of 4).
When we move to labour market institutions, we expect that wage com-
pressing institutions may reduce within-group variance in earnings, thus
aﬀecting ex post EOp more than ex ante one. Here data availability, es-
pecially for new entrants in the EU, is scarce. We consider two indirect
measures of the degree of institutionalisation: the presence of union (prox-
ied by union membership over dependent employment23) and the degree of
employment protection, computed by OECD24. In accordance with the liter-
ature, we expected that when the labour market is heavily regulated, wages
are less related to individual features, since unions press for job-related pay
scales (Visser and Checchi, 2009). In addition, employment protection re-
duces labour turnover, reducing individual income variability (and therefore
aggregate wage inequality). Both measures have been proved to reduce to-
tal income inequality in the aggregate (Checchi and García Peñalosa, 2008).
Figure 9 shows that in bivariate correlation this is true for union presence,
but not for employment protection. When considering multivariate OLS re-
gressions (see columns 5-6 of 4), we find support to our expectation: union
presence is positively correlated to EOp, while employment protection is
statistically insignificant; moreover, the eﬀect is stronger with respect to ex
post EOp than with the ex ante one.
Eventually, we have considered the role of welfare provisions. In general
we do not have apriori theoretical expectation on their correlation with EOp,
since taxes and subsidies aim to contain income inequality (through taxa-
21Also from Eurostat 2005. The pupil-teacher ratio is calculated by dividing the number
of full-time equivalent pupils by the number of full-time equivalent teachers teaching at
ISCED level 1. Only teachers in service (including special education teachers) are taken
into account.
22Also from Eurostat 2005. This indicator is defined as total public expenditure on
education, expressed as a percentage of GDP. Generally, the public sector funds education
either by bearing directly the current and capital expenses of educational institutions
or by supporting students and their families with scholarships and public loans as well
as by transferring public subsidies for educational activities to private firms or non-profit
organisations. Both types of transactions together are reported as total public expenditure
on education.
23Data were kindly made available by Jelle Visser (University of Amsterdam).
24 It is the index of overall Employment Protection Legislation (version 2), referred to
2003 (OECD 2004).
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tion) and to provide income insurance against unforeseeable events (through
subsidies), but in no case they include compensatory measures which atten-
uate the impact of circumstances. However, as long as fiscal redistribution
sustains low incomes (that may be correlated to disadvantaged conditions),
we could find some positive correlation with EOp. We have selected two
proxies for the welfare state, which are shown in Figure 10. In the left panel
we have computed the ratio between the Gini index computed over gross
incomes and the Gini index computed over disposable incomes: the larger
is the ratio, the stronger is the redistributive role of the state.25 We ob-
serve a negative correlation with inequality of opportunities, which does not
occur when we consider social expenditure in the bottom panels of Figure
10 (at last for the ex ante measure).26 When we consider multivariate OLS
regressions (see columns 7-8 of 4), once more we find stronger association of
fiscal redistribution with ex post EOp than with ex ante EOp, while social
expenditure remains statistically insignificant.
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have presented alternative approaches to measuring inequal-
ity of opportunities. We have shown both ex-ante and ex-post approaches,
both parametrically and not. We have then applied these methods to Euro-
pean countries, providing rankings based on countries similarities. We have
shown that standard income inequality and inequality of opportunities do
not necessarily oﬀer the same type of rankings (especially when comparing
formerly non market economies with coordinated market economies, like
Nordic ones). We then speculate about which is the most favorable insti-
tutional environment with respect to maximising EOp. Our results suggest
that ex ante equality of opportunity is enhanced by educational institutions
that promote lower impact of family backgrounds onto educational attain-
ments (like pre-primary education and higher public expenditure in educa-
tion). Conversely ex post equality of opportunity is positively correlated to
union presence in the labour market and to fiscal redistribution.
25Data are from the OECD database (http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=
INEQUALITY) and are referred to mid-2000.
26From Eurostat 2005: Expenditure on social protection contains: social benefits (trans-
fers, in cash or in kind, to households and individuals to relieve them of the burden of
a defined set of risks or needs); administration costs (costs charged to the scheme for its
management and administration); other expenditure (miscellaneous expenditure by social
protection schemes).
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Table 1: Diﬀerent measures od income inequality
country OECD Gini EUROSTAT Gini EUSILC Gini EUSILC Mld
AT 0.27 0.26 0.275 0.180
BE 0.27 0.28 0.266 0.145
CY 0.290 0.170
CZ 0.27 0.26 0.280 0.176
DE 0.30 0.26 0.290 0.191
DK 0.23 0.24 0.217 0.083
EE 0.344 0.243
ES 0.32 0.32 0.314 0.216
FI 0.27 0.26 0.271 0.136
FR 0.28 0.28 0.285 0.163
GR 0.32 0.33 0.316 0.200
HU 0.29 0.28 0.310 0.208
IE 0.33 0.32 0.296 0.188
IT 0.35 0.33 0.309 0.196
LT 0.356 0.228
LU 0.26 0.26 0.276 0.148
LV 0.357 0.229
NL 0.27 0.27 0.270 0.192
NO 0.28 0.28 0.262 0.130
PL 0.37 0.36 0.364 0.271
PT 0.38 0.38 0.354 0.247
SE 0.23 0.23 0.231 0.106
SI 0.239 0.104
SK 0.27 0.26 0.278 0.132
UK 0.34 0.34 0.319 0.204
Notes: EUSILC Gini and MLD are given by authors’ calculations; OECD Gini on working
age population and Eurostat Gini are taken from http://stats.oecd.org and OECD (2008).
18
Table 2: Inequality of opportunity as a percentage of total inequality
direct ex ante indirect ex ante direct ex post indirect ex post
AT 0.215 0.020 0.387 0.024
BE 0.171 0.042 0.405 0.006
CY 0.300 0.053 0.453 0.006
CZ 0.108 0.022 0.381 0.011
DE 0.182 0.028 0.315 0.018
DK 0.142 0.007 0.269 0.005
EE 0.107 0.030 0.324 0.017
ES 0.196 0.053 0.345 0.004
FI 0.097 0.003 0.212 0.013
FR 0.127 0.015 0.285 0.011
GR 0.168 0.039 0.308 0.001
HU 0.101 0.015 0.303 0.014
IE 0.223 0.047 0.441 0.045
IT 0.141 0.024 0.324 0.008
LT 0.094 0.005 0.246 0.006
LU 0.235 0.039 0.401 0.004
LV 0.122 0.004 0.269 0.019
NL 0.190 0.112 0.394 0.004
NO 0.025 0.005 0.344 0.008
PL 0.091 0.012 0.225 0.010
PT 0.121 0.010 0.350 0.005
SE 0.111 0.011 0.241 0.000
SI 0.045 0.007 0.158 0.000
SK 0.133 0.013 0.292 0.022
UK 0.205 0.038 0.406 0.058
Notes: Notes: Column 1 reports the amount of the MLD in relative terms due to circum-
stances; column 2 shows the MLD in relative terms due to type variation of eﬀort; column
3 shows the MLD in relative terms calculated by the tranche approach whereas column 4
reports the ex post type variation of eﬀort.
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Table 3: Inequality of opportunity in absolute term
direct exante indirect ex ante direct expost indirect expost
AT 0.039 0.004 0.07 0.004
( 0.0005 ) ( 0.0002 ) ( 0.0022 ) ( 0.0002 )
BE 0.025 0.006 0.059 0.0009
( 0.0004 ) ( 0.0005 ) ( 0.0028 ) ( 0.0003 )
CY 0.051 0.009 0.077 0.001
( 0.001 ) ( 0.0013 ) ( 0.0024 ) ( 0.0002 )
CZ 0.019 0.004 0.067 0.002
( 0.0006 ) ( 0.0004 ) ( 0.0043 ) ( 0.0004 )
DE 0.035 0.005 0.06 0.003
( 0.0002 ) ( 0.0002 ) ( 0.0012 ) ( 0.0001 )
DK 0.012 0.0006 0.022 0.0004
( 0.0002 ) ( 0.0001 ) ( 0.0008 ) ( 0.0001 )
EE 0.026 0.007 0.079 0.004
( 0.0006 ) ( 0.0008 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.0004 )
ES 0.042 0.011 0.074 0.0008
( 0.001 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.002 ) ( 0.0002 )
FI 0.013 0.0005 0.029 0.002
( 0.0003 ) ( 0.00003 ) ( 0.0019 ) ( 0.0002 )
FR 0.021 0.002 0.047 0.002
( 0.0003 ) ( 0.0001 ) ( 0.0014 ) ( 0.0001 )
GR 0.034 0.008 0.062 0.0001
( 0.0007 ) ( 0.0005 ) ( 0.0024 ) ( 0.0002 )
HU 0.021 0.003 0.063 0.003
( 0.0007 ) ( 0.0004 ) ( 0.0038 ) ( 0.0004 )
IE 0.042 0.009 0.083 0.008
( 0.0007 ) ( 0.0011 ) ( 0.0039 ) ( 0.0004 )
IT 0.028 0.005 0.063 0.002
( 0.0002 ) ( 0.0002 ) ( 0.0017 ) ( 0.0002 )
LT 0.021 0.001 0.056 0.001
( 0.0005 ) ( 0.0001 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.0004 )
LU 0.035 0.006 0.059 0.001
( 0.0009 ) ( 0.0003 ) ( 0.0021 ) ( 0.0002 )
LV 0.028 0.001 0.061 0.004
( 0.0008 ) ( 0.0001 ) ( 0.0029 ) ( 0.0003 )
NL 0.036 0.021 0.076 0.001
( 0.0004 ) ( 0.0019 ) ( 0.0035 ) ( 0.0003 )
NO 0.003 0.0007 0.045 0.001
( 0.00007 ) ( 0.00005 ) ( 0.0017 ) ( 0.0002 )
PL 0.025 0.0033 0.061 0.0026
( 0.0004 ) ( 0.0001 ) ( 0.0017 ) ( 0.0002 )
PT 0.03 0.002 0.087 0.001
( 0.0008 ) ( 0.0002 ) ( 0.0058 ) ( 0.0005 )
SE 0.012 0.001 0.026 0.000002
( 0.0002 ) ( 0.0001 ) ( 0.0012 ) ( 0.0001 )
SI 0.005 0.0007 0.016 0.00004
( 0.0002 ) ( 0.0001 ) ( 0.0008 ) ( 0.00008 )
SK 0.018 0.002 0.038 0.003
( 0.0004 ) ( 0.0001 ) ( 0.0038 ) ( 0.0003 )
UK 0.042 0.008 0.083 0.012
( 0.0008 ) ( 0.0009 ) ( 0.0049 ) ( 0.0004 )
Notes: Column 1 reports the amount of the MLD in absolute terms due to circumstances;
column 2 shows the MLD in absolute terms due to type variation of eﬀort; column 3 shows
the MLD in absolute terms calculated by the tranche approach whereas column 4 reports
the ex post type variation of eﬀort. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 4: Estimated correlation between institutional measures and Inequal-
ity of opportunities (absolute measures)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
ex ante ex post ex ante ex p ost ex ante ex p ost ex ante ex p ost
enrolm ent in preprim ary -0 .0113 -0.0304
over prim ary (OECD 2002) [-0 .69] [-1 .27]
vo cational programmes (Eurostat 2005) -0 .0001 -0.0002
[-0 .71] [-1 .02]
exp end iture in education/gdp -0.0052** -0.0102**
(Eurostat 2005) [-3 .40] [-3 .35]
pupil/teacher ratio in 0.0003 -0.0001
primary school (Eurostat 2005) [0 .38] [-0 .05]
union density rate (2005) -0 .0003** -0.0007**
[-3.63] [-4 .75]
OECD employment protection l -0 .0041 -0.0062
egislation version II (2003) [-0.99] [-0 .91]
g in i b efore/after tax and -0.0345* -0.0803**
transfer (OECD m id 2000) [-2 .50] [-3 .87]
exp end iture in so cia l 0 .0003 -0.0002
protection/gdp (Eurostat 2005) [0 .80] [-0 .24]
Observations 20 20 23 23 18 18 17 17
R -squared 0.05 0.11 0.27 0.28 0.38 0.57 0.22 0.54
Log likelihood 61.88 52.67 76.03 61.61 59.2 53.64 53.96 50.07
Robust t statistics in brackets - constant included - Columns 1-2 exclude Cyprus, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia. Columns 3-4 exclude Cyprus and Norway; Columns 5-6
exclude Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Slovak Republic and Slovenia.
Columns 7-8 exclude Finland, France, Greece, Hungary,Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia.
** significant at 1%; * significant at 5%.
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Figure 1 - Income inequality according to diﬀerent data source (OECD and
EUSILC)
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Figure 2 - Income inequality according to diﬀerent indicators (Gini and
Mld) - EUSILC 2005
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Figure 3 - Absolute opportunity inequality: ex ante and ex post - EUSILC
2005
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Figure 4 - Income inequality and ex ante opportunity inequality - EUSILC
2005
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Figure 5 - Income inequality and ex post opportunity inequality - EUSILC
2005
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Figure 6 - Cluster analysis based on inequality
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Figure 7 - Opportunity inequality and schooling
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Figure 8 - Opportunity inequality and educational resources
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Figure 9 - Opportunity inequality and labour market institutions
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Figure 10 - Opportunity inequality and the role of fiscal redistributione
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5 Appendix
Table 5: Summary statistics on main individual variables
country m ean(x) sd(x) female fore ign not densely m (age) sd(age) education N
pop 1 2 3
AT 18246.1 9001.4 0.51 0.11 0.27 43.3 8.0 0.69 0.31 4,558
BE 21607.1 12577.9 0.44 0.10 0.51 43.3 7.8 0.0052 0.51 0.49 2,995
CY 13286.8 6507.7 0.45 0.13 0.58 43.4 8.3 0.0133 0.68 0.31 3,247
CZ 4468.7 2299.0 0.47 0.03 0.31 43.9 8.8 0.84 0.16 2,696
DE 19603.9 10056.1 0.55 0.05 0.43 44.2 7.4 0.48 0.52 7,421
DK 19673.5 8300.3 0.50 0.04 0.32 44.3 8.5 0.64 0.36 2,649
EE 3808.8 2618.4 0.53 0.15 0.32 44.5 8.0 0.56 0.44 2,801
ES 14096.9 8102.7 0.41 0.06 0.49 42.7 8.3 0.66 0.34 9,496
FI 20982.7 10183.7 0.49 0.02 0.23 45.2 8.5 0.59 0.41 3,798
FR 19463.9 10138.8 0.48 0.11 0.44 43.5 8.2 0.67 0.33 6,558
GR 13771.9 8412.7 0.37 0.09 0.40 42.9 8.4 0.70 0.30 3,812
HU 3589.7 2151.5 0.51 0.02 0.32 42.8 8.5 0.0025 0.82 0.17 5,210
IE 23497.2 12849.7 0.62 0.11 0.36 44.7 8.3 0.57 0.43 3,446
IT 18726.1 13843.6 0.42 0.05 0.35 43.0 8.1 0.0039 0.77 0.22 15,562
LT 3081.6 2349.5 0.53 0.06 0.45 44.6 7.9 0.37 0.63 3,170
LU 30182.1 14510.6 0.44 0.50 0.46 41.4 8.1 0.68 0.32 2,365
LV 2939.6 2099.4 0.55 0.16 0.51 43.7 8.2 0.0010 0.62 0.38 2,104
NL 18546.1 8591.0 0.51 0.05 43.7 8.6 0.57 0.43 3,637
NO 20594.8 9874.7 0.48 0.06 0.51 43.7 8.7 0.0004 0.57 0.43 2,503
PL 3690.3 2561.9 0.46 0.00 0.39 42.9 7.8 0.0026 0.75 0.25 9,377
PT 9094.9 6268.2 0.45 0.02 0.35 43.2 8.4 0.87 0.13 3,057
SE 19452.9 8256.4 0.49 0.10 0.19 44.5 8.9 0.57 0.43 2,435
SI 9596.1 4124.1 0.48 0.11 42.3 7.9 0.77 0.23 2,623
SK 3732.0 3183.4 0.49 0.02 0.28 43.8 8.0 0.80 0.20 4,070
UK 23861.1 13872.2 0.51 0.09 0.73 44.0 8.6 0.55 0.45 5,421
The columns of this table show the following statistics: 1. average post tax individual
income; 2 standard deviation of post tax individual incomes; 3 percentage of females; 4.
percentage of foreign born; 5. percentage of individuals not living in a densely populated
area; 6. average age; 7 age standard deviation; 8 percentage of individuals with no educa-
tion; 9 percentage of individuals with primary or secondary school degree ; 10 percentage
of individuals with higher degree. 11 number of observations.
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Table 6: Summary statistics on main parental variables
country education occupation N
1 2 3 1 2 3
AT 0.00 0.93 0.07 0.09 0.31 0.59 4,558
BE 0.10 0.66 0.24 0.28 0.25 0.47 2,995
CY 0.26 0.66 0.08 0.08 0.30 0.62 3,247
CZ 0.00 0.89 0.11 0.13 0.17 0.70 2,696
DE 0.00 0.65 0.35 0.25 0.23 0.52 7,421
DK 0.00 0.78 0.22 0.22 0.30 0.48 2,649
EE 0.01 0.70 0.29 0.15 0.10 0.75 2,801
ES 0.20 0.69 0.11 0.12 0.28 0.60 9,496
FI 0.03 0.80 0.17 0.17 0.32 0.52 3,798
FR 0.04 0.86 0.10 0.16 0.29 0.55 6,558
GR 0.24 0.67 0.09 0.14 0.51 0.35 3,812
HU 0.01 0.85 0.15 0.10 0.22 0.68 5,210
IE 0.02 0.84 0.15 0.38 0.14 0.48 3,446
IT 0.10 0.86 0.04 0.19 0.24 0.58 15,562
LT 0.04 0.69 0.28 0.12 0.11 0.77 3,170
LU 0.05 0.76 0.19 0.22 0.23 0.55 2,365
LV 0.01 0.75 0.23 0.13 0.10 0.77 2,104
NL 0.00 0.82 0.18 0.41 0.20 0.39 3,637
NO 0.00 0.56 0.44 0.25 0.30 0.45 2,503
PL 0.11 0.80 0.09 0.11 0.36 0.53 9,377
PT 0.34 0.63 0.03 0.08 0.31 0.61 3,057
SE 0.00 0.80 0.20 2,435
SI 0.03 0.88 0.10 0.11 0.27 0.61 2,623
SK 0.00 0.89 0.11 0.14 0.14 0.72 4,070
UK 0.50 0.16 0.34 5,421
The columns of this table show the following statistics: 1. percentage of individuals
who have at least one of the parents employed in the categories 8000 and 9000 of the
ISCO88 classification; 2. percentage of individuals who have at least one of the parents
employed in categories from 5000 to 7000 of the ISCO88 classification; 3. percentage of
individuals who have at least one of the parents employed in categories 1000 to 4000 of
the ISCO88 classification (see the text for further details); 4. percentage of individuals
who have both parents with no education; 5. percentage of individuals who have at least
one of the parents with primary or secondary school degree; 6 . percentage of individuals
who have at least one of the parents with post-secondary or higher degree; 7. number of
observations available for the parental education variable.
Table 7: Tax rate in Cyprus
Taxable income in euro tax rate
15054 - 22580 20
22581 - 30107 25
30108 - 30
Source: http://www.mof.gov.cy
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Table 8: Tax rate in Denmark
Taxable income in euro tax rate
0 - 3250 0
32501 - 6500 13.3
65001 - 9750 19.2
97501 - 13000 24.1
130001 - 16250 27.6
162501 - 19500 28.7
195001 - 26000 30.4
260001 - 32500 32.7
325001 - 39000 34.5
390001 - 45500 36.2
455001 - 52000 38.9
520001 - 65000 42.3
650001 - 97500 48.4
975001 - 130000 53
130001 59.2
Source: www.skm.dk.
Table 9: Tax rate in Finland
Taxable income in euro tax rate
12200 - 17000 9
17001 - 20000 14
20001 - 32800 19.5
32801 - 58200 25
58201 - 32.5
Source: www.vero.fi.
Table 10: Tax rate in Hungary
Taxable income in euro tax rate
1 - 5960 18
5961 - 38
Source: www.worldwide-tax.com.
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Table 11: Tax rate in the Netherlands
Taxable income in euro tax rate
1 - 16265 0
16266 - 29543 7.95
29544 - 50652 42
50653 - 52
Source: OECD.
Table 12: Tax rate in Norway
Taxable income in NOK tax rate
lower limit tax rate
0 0.0
29600 - 43022 25.0
43023 - 65999 7.8
66000 - 102580 35.8
102581 - 185160 27.1
185161 - 380999 35.8
381000 - 799999 47.8
800000 51.3
Source: www.Taxnorway.no.
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